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ABSTRACT
Shifts in the extent of competition, which affect markup ratios, are possible sources of
aggregate business fluctuations. Markups are countercyclical, and booms are times at which the
economy operates more efficiently. We begin with a real model in which markup ratios correspond
to the prices of differentiated intermediate inputs relative to the price of undifferentiated fmal product.
If the nominal prices of the differentiated goods are relatively sticky, then unexpected inflation reduces
the relative price of intermediates and thereby mimics the output effects from an increase in
competition. In an open economy, domestic output is stimulated by reductions in the relative price of
foreign intermediates and, therefore, by unexpected inflation abroad. The various versions ofthe model
imply that the relative prices of less competitive goods move countercyclically. We find support for
this hypothesis from price data of four-digit manufacturing industries.
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An important branch of the macroeconomics literature views variations in markup
ratios as major features of business cycles. This literature has recently been sur-
veyed by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)- From the standpoint of generating
fluctuations in aggregate economic activity, movethents in markups—reflecting
shifts in the extent of competition—work similarly to the technological distur-
bances usually stressed in real business cycle (RBC) models. Hence, shifts in
the extent of competition provide another source of real shocks within the BBC
framework. In the typical analysis, markups exhibit a countercyclical pattern,
and booms are times at which the economy operates more efficiently.
This paper begins with a real model in which intermediate inputs are dif-
ferentiated products that are sold under conditions of imperfect competition.
Final product, which can be used for consumption or to create the intermediate
goods, is undifferentiated and, hence, competitive. In this model, the markup
ratios correspond to the prices of the intermediate goods relative to the price
of final product. A reduction in markup ratios spurs the use of intermediates
and thereby generates an efficient expansion of output and consumption. Labor
productivity also rises, and the increase in the marginal product of labor leads
to an increase in the real wage rate.
An extended version of the model assumes that the nominal prices of the
differentiated intermediate goods are sticky relative to the nominal price of
undifferentiated final product. In this environment, unexpected inflation in the
price of final product tends to reduce the relative price of intermediates. The
expansionary effect on output is the same as that generated from an increase in
competition. Hence, some amount of unexpected inflation can look desirable,
ex post, to the monetary authority.
A further extension allows for trade of the intermediate goods across inter-
national borders at nonzero transaction costs. (Final product is assumed to be
tradable without transaction costs.) In this model, increases in foreign competi-
tion and unexpected inflation in the foreign country tend to be expansionary at
home. The model also has implications for the effect of openness on a monetary
authority's incentive to inflate.
The various versions of the model all imply that the relative prices of less
competitive goods would move countercyclically. In a later section of the paper,
we use price data from four-digit manufacturing industries to test this hypothe-
sis. The results support the proposition that less competitive—or, at least, more
concentrated—sectors feature more countercyclical movements in their relative
output prices.
32 The Model of a Closed Economy
2.1 The Real Model
Competitive firms produce output using a varieties-type production function,
which was originated by Spence (1976), Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), and Ethier
(1982). The output of firm i is given by
(1)
where A > 0 is a productivity parameter, L is firm i's employment of labor,
o <c1, Xfi is the amount of intermediate input of type j used by firm i, and
N is the uumber of types of intermediates available. Everyone has free access
to the technology shown in equation (1). In the basic model, labor is exchanged
on a competitive, economy-wide labor market.
We think of the intermediate inputs as specialized goods, such as machine
tools and computers. In practice, these goods tend to be durables, so that in-
creases in the Xj require investment outlays. However, to keep things simple,
we assume that the intermediate goods are nondurable. This assumption elimi-
nates any dynamic elements, but the model can be extended, without changing
the basic results, to treat the inputs as capital goods.
Each firm maximizes profit, taking as given the economy-wide real wage rate,
W, and the price, Pj, of each type of intermediate good. (The prices are all
measured in units of final product.) The first-order conditions for the choices
of intermediate inputs are
AaL'X1 =.F,j= 1N. (2)
Therefore, every producer of final goods will use all N varieties of the interme-
diate inputs as long as all of the prices are finite. It can also be readily verified
that the profit of each firm is zero if the real wage rate equals the marginal
product of labor:
(3)
Final output is a homogeneous good that can be used for consumption or
to produce intermediate goods. All consumer goods are identical. Prices of
consumer goods are the same everywhere and are normalized to one.
We use a simple structure to allow for imperfect competition in the exchange
of the specialized intermediate inputs. These goods are produced in sectors
j= 1,...,N.We assume that each sector has a large number of potential firms
that have the ability to produce each type of intermediate good, effectively by
sticking distinctive labels on the homogeneous final product. However, these
firms differ in their costs of production, in the sense of the number of units of
final product required to create a unit of intermediate good. We assume that
4each sector possesses a single leader, who has the lowest costs of production,
and we normalize so that this lowest-cost provider can produce one unit of
intermediate for each unit of final product. If no potential competitors existed,
then the leader would price at the monopoly level. The constant-elasticity
demand function implied by equation (2) determines the monopoly price of
each intermediate good to be 1/a.1
To allow for the potential competition, let p >1be the number of units
of final good required by the next most efficient producer to create a unit of
intermediate good in sector j.Thesector leader is then assumed to use a limit-
pricing strategy to determine the price charged for the good. Specifically, if
c1/a,then the leader sets the price just below p to deter entry of the next
most efficient firm (arid, hence, of all the other firms). Thus, the leader's price
is given by
P =if1<p<1/ci, (4)
=1/aif p ￿ 1/a.
To simplify, we assume for now that the structure of competition is the same
across sectors, so that p =pfor all j,where1 CpC1/a.In this case, the
parameter p represents the economy-wide markup ratio.
The quantities of intermediates employed by firm i are given by
X5 =(Aa/p)1'L, j= 1,...,N. (5)
Substitution into equation (1) and aggregation over the firms determines the
aggregate level of output as
V =A1' . N, (6)
where L is the economy-wide labor force, which is assumed for now to be con-
stant. A lower p encourages the use of intermediates (equation [5]) and thereby
raises output, Y, in equation (6). Since employment, L, is fixed, the increase
in output corresponds to a rise in labor's average productivity, Y/L. The rise
in productivity occurs for a given form of the production function because the
'The parameter a also equals the share of payments to intermediate goods in total output.
Therefore, the monopoly markup ratio for intermediates is restricted to equal the reciprocal of
the factor share of intermediates. This restriction applies because the parameter a in equation
(1) represents two things—factor shares and tlse degree of substitution across the intermediate
inputs. To disentangle these two effects: the production function can be generalized to
IN\a/a
where0< a1. Equation (1) applies when a =a.For given a, a higher a moans that the
intermediate inputs are closer substitutes, with perfect snbstitution corresponding to a =1.
The monopoly markup ratio can be determined (if N >> 1) to equal 1/a in the generalized
setup, whereas the parameter a stiu equals the factor share for intermediates. Hence, in this
representation, the rnonpoly markup ratio for intermediates no longer necessarily equals the
reciprocal of the incon,e share.
5heightened competition corresponding to the lower r leads to a more efficient—
in this case, more intermediated—structure of production.2 First-best output
turns out to correspond to ji= 1iii equation (6) (see below). The ratio of actual
to first-best output is equal to (i/,t)ra/() < 1. Output is also increasing in
the productivity parameter, A, and in the number of intermediates, N. In the
related growth literature (summarized in Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1995, Ch.
6]), increases in N are the key to growth. However, N is fixed in the present
context.
Households own all of the firms in the economy. The only firms that make
profits in equilibrium are the lowest-cost providers of intermediates in each of
the N sectors. The ownership rights in these firms are assumed to be distrib-
uted evenly across the households. In this case, the model has a representative
household, whose net income and consumption correspond to gross output (from
equation [6]) less the total production of intermediates (determined from equa-
tion [5]). The formula for aggregate consumption is
C =A11a1—"L (1/it)1/(1—) (— ) N. (7)
It can be verified from equation (7) that C falls with p (when p ￿ 1) and that C
is maximized at p =1.That is, consumption of the representative individual is
maximized under perfect competition, where the economy-wide markup ratio,
ji,equalsone.3 At p =1,each type of intermediate good is efficiently utilized up
to the point where its marginal product equals unity (the lowest-cost provider's
constant cost of production) in equation (2).
If we had imposed the condition p c1,which is inconsistent with the dis-
cussion that underlies equation (4), then equation (7) implies that C falls if
decreases. The reason is that intermediates would be utilized too much from an
efficiency standpoint if p c1.However, the specific results from equation (7)
depend on the unrealistic assumption that the providers of intermediates would
continue to meet all of the demand even when p < 1. Er fact, if the markup
ratio is set below unity, the lowest-cost providers would lose money on each unit
produced and sold and would be better off closing down. In this case, output
and consumption would collapse to zero. The general lesson—which will be im-
portant when we consider unexpected inflation—is that the economy operates
inefficiently when p C 1.
In this real model, business fluctuations could be driven by shocks to the
overall productivity parameter, A, and the markup ratio, p. Movements in A
look like the disturbances that are usually stressed in real business cycle models.
For given p these shocks generate movements in output without any changes
in the markup ratio—that is, the markup ratio would be acyclical in this case.
For given parameters of the production function in equation (l)—or the
more general form presented in footnote 1—shifts in p in equation (4) reflect
2Similar effects occur in the model considered by Basu (1995, section nfl) -
3Notethat the number N is fixed exogenously in this model. ilence. the economy does not.
need any monopoly profits to provide incentives for invention, as in Romer (1990) and the
rest of the endogenons growth literature summarized in Barro and SaIa-i-Martio (1995, cbs.
and 7).
6exogenous changes in the economy-wide extent of competition.4 An increase in
j.c leads to a decline in output and, if p > 1, also to a decline in consUmption.
Hence, these shocks would generate a countercyclical pattern for the markup
ratio.
The markup ratios in this model measure the prices of specialized goods that
are sold with some degree of monopoly power expressed relative to the prices
of competitive goods. In our context, the specialized goods are intermediate
inputs, and the undifferentiated goods are final products. However, the results
would be similar if, instead, some or all of the specialized goods were final
products. In this case, an increase in the extent of competition applicable to
the specialized final goods would be expansionary; in particular, households
would be better off, and measured real quantities of GDP and consumption
would rise.
Our concept of the markup ratio differs from the one stressed in the liter-
ature, such as Bus (1987) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999). That liter-
ature focuses on the price of final product expressed relative to the marginal
cost of production, which involves variations in inputs such as labor. For ex-
ample, if labor input is paid at the real wage rate W, then the Bils markup
ratio equals FL/W. If the production function takes the form of equation
(1), then FL =(1
—) . (Y/L),5and, hence, FL/W =(1
—n)/Sh(L),where
Sh(L) =WL/Yis labor's share of the total gross product. Therefore, to gen-
erate a pattern in which this concept of the markup ratio is countercyclical, the
labor share has to be procyclical. However, the labor share tends empirically
to be countercyclical—see Rotemberg and Woodford (1999, section 2.1). They
argue that the labor share is less countercyclical than it first appears, but they
are still unable to generate a procyclical pattern.
More generally, it seems that the markup ratio ought to be defined in terms
of ratios of prices of goods or inputs that are sold under conditions of monopoly
power to prices of goods or inputs that are sold under competitive conditions.
The implicit assumption in the Bils (1987) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
frameworks6 seems to be that final products are specialized and sold under
conditions of monopoly power, whereas inputs (such as labor and raw materials)
are non-specialized and sold under competitive conditions, From an empirical
standpoint, it is not obvious that this assumption is reasonable.
Returning to the model, the real wage rate is determined from equations (3)
4One possibility that we neglect here is that the state of the business cycle may affect the
degree of competition and, hence, the markup ratio. Rotemherg and Saloner (1986) argue
that booms tend to intensib' competition and. therefore reduce markup ratios. rn the present
model, this effect would operate only if the business cycle influenced the production costs of
potential competitors relative to the costs of industry leaders.
5This result holds more generally if the production function can be written as V1 =
G(I4,Ks). where g1 represents the vector of intermediate inputs for j =1N, and K is
capital input.
01n this context, some other models that are analogous include Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987) and Mankiw (1991).
7and (6) to be7
W =(1
—a).Ahj(1)aa/(1).(1//(1) N. (8)
Therefore, shocks to A and p cause W to move along with output, which is
determined by equation (6). That is, the real wage rate moves procyclically.
Labor's share of the total gross product, WL/Y, is fixed at I —a(see
equation [3]) and is therefore acydical unless a is changing. Correspondingly,
the share in payments to intermediate inputs is fixed at a. These payments
can be broken down into profits and production costs of intermediate-goods
providers. The ratio of profit to output is increasing in p, whereas the ratio of
production costs (for intermediate-goods providers) to output is decreasing in
p. These ratios are invariant with A.
One difficulty with this analysis of shares is that the usual concept of gross
product in the national accounts nets out non-durable intermediate inputs, such
as the Xj in the model. In the present setting, this concept of product equals
consumption, because no durable goods have been introduced.8 ilowever, as
noted before, the treatment of the intermediate inputs as nondurable was a
matter of analytical convenience and not an accurate description of the typical
differentiated good used as an input to production. We can revise the model
to treat the Xjj's as durables. If we assume mobility of these durables across
types, then the total stock of capital constitutes the single state variable. In
this case, the model has dynamics similar to the standard neoclassical growth
model. In this setting, the ratio of wL to gross product—which is inclusive of
the gross investment outlays on intermediates—is fixed at 1 —a.Therefore, this
more realistic version of the model still has the implication that labor's share
of gross product would be acyclical.
A countercyclical pattern for labor's share of gross output tends to emerge if
we modi the production function of equation (1) to have diminishing returns
to scale and also introduce a fixed cost of operation for each firm. For example,
we could have
• (9)
ir this model, the Bus markup ratio. FL/W, always equals one. This result! makes sense
because, by assumption, the markets for labor and final product are both characterized by
perfect competition. We could extend the model to allow some of the labor inputs to be
specialized and sold under conditions of monopoly power. In this case, we could consider
another markup ratio, iavolving the wage of specialized labor input exprossod relative to that
of undifferentiated labor input.
tThe ratio of payments to labor to consumption is given froan equations (8) and (7) by
niL/C =(1
—a).p/(p..-a).
Therefore, a decrease in p raises niL/C, that is, the ratio of labor payments to consunription
would move procyclically in the model. This pattern does appear in the data for most OECD
countries if cyclical patterns are based on Hodrick-Prescott filtering, with niL measured by
compensation of employees and C measured hy total consumer expenditure or by consumer
expenditure on non-durables and services.
8where 0 <3<1—aand > 0. In this (Marshallian) model, the free-entry
condition determines the number of firms so that profit is zero. However, if the
number of firms does not respond to temporary variations in A and it,then
we find that booms (generated by high A or low ji) have relatively low shares
in output of payments to labor and intermediate inputs. The share in output
of profits of final-goods producers is procyclical—and is positive in booms arid
negative in recessions.
A labor-leisure choice could be introduced, so that L would be variable.
We can think of each individual's work effort as depending on W with the
usual types of substitution and income effects, For example, an economy-wide,
temporary decline in p would raise output in each sector (equation [6]) and also
raise the economy-wide real wage rate, TV, in equation (8). Since the disturbance
is temporary, the income effect from the higher real wage rate would be weak;
therefore, the dominant impact on current labor supply would derive from the
substitution effect that favors work over leisure. Hence, L would tend to rise,
implying that employment would be procyclical.
Most of the results are similar if we modify the basic model to allow each
sector to have a different degree of competition and, hence, a different markup
ratio, p. (We assume that 1/a applies for all j.)Thesolution for
aggregate output is then a generalization of equation (6):
Y = [(1//1_] .
(10)
Therefore,each sector is weighted inversely to its markup ratio, p3. The formula




The consumption madmizing value for each of the markup ratios is again p =1.
2.2 Nominal price stickiness
To introduce nominal elements and a possible role for monetary policy, we use
a simple setting in which the nominal prices of the intermediate goods involve
some stickiness, whereas the prices of the final goods are flexible.9 More gen-
erally, the assumption is that the more specialized and, hence, less competitive
products—which, in our model, are the intermediate inputs—tend to feature
9Our setting has synchronized price setting for the various goods. That is, the prices
of intermediate goods all adjust together with a one-period lag (and thc prico of the single
type of final product adjusts with no lag). Some alternative models assume staggered price
adjustment—see, for example, Calvo (1983) and chad, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2000).Stag-
gered price adjustment may be empirically realistic and important for the model's detailed
dynamics. However, this specification adds complexity without affecting the main results of
our analysis.
9less flexibility in their nominal prices. This specification accords with the theo-
retical model of Rotemberg and Saloner (1987), who find that the cost of having
the wrong price tends to be greater for duopolists than for monopolists. Hence,
with some fixed costs for changing prices, the prices of less competitive goods
would tend to adjust less often. Empirical support for this specification is pro-
vided by Carlton (1986), who finds in the data of Stigler and Kindahl (1970)
thatless competitive industries (as gauged by concentration ratios) have more
rigid prices (as measured by the frequency of zero month-to-month changes).
Basu (1995) refers to this evidence and also uses it to motivate an assumption
of relative rigidity in the prices of intermediate goods.
Let p be the nominal price of the jth intermediate good and p the nominal
price of final goods (and, hence, consumer goods), all of which sell at one price.
If all nominal prices were flexible, then the preceding analysis would go through,
with the relative prices of each intermediate good, p /p, set to equal the markup
ratio,in accordance with equation (4). If the degree of competition were
the same in each sector, then =/1for all j would again apply. The nominal
wage rate would then equal pW, where W is given in equation (8).
Suppose that the nominal price of final product, p, is determined through
some stochastic process by the country's monetary authority. That is, nominal
monetary aggregates—which we do not model explicitly—are assumed to adjust
to achieve a target nominal price of final goods.1°
We assume now that the lowest-cost provider of intermediates in sector j
setsthe nominal price Vj one period in advance. That is, the industry leader
effectively offers a contract to its buyers (who are producers of final product)
in which the nominal price of the intermediate good is guaranteed for the next
period. We assume that the other part of the contract is that the leader commits
to meet the demand for the intermediate good that the customers turn out to
express next period. (We consider later that the leader might, instead, opt not
to meet the demand when the price falls to cover the cost of production.)
Other potential providers of intermediates in sector jcanbe thought of as
offering similar fixed-nominal-price contracts. However, in the equilibrium, the
lowest-cost provider will again adopt a limit-pricing strater, so that the next
most efficient firm (and, moreover, all of the other firms) will be motivated not
to participate.
To find the leader's nominal price, the only new element that we need is the
probability distribution of p. As a first approximation, the industry leader in
sector jwillset the price as
Vi/5 Ep, (12)
whereis the markup ratio given in equation (4), and Ep is each producer's
one-period-ahead expectation of p. (All agents are assumed to have the same
0In much of the related business cycle literature, such as Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)
and Mankiw (1991). real effects fronx monetary stimuli depend on movements in real money
balances. In the present model, the real effects from nominal shocks derive, instead, from
changes in the prices of intermediatcs goods relative to the price of final product.
10information and, therefore, the same value for Ep.) In the present case, pj
will represent the target markup ratio, which will not be realized exactly if p
departs from Ep. Equation (12) implies pd/p=p5 as before, if p is known with
certainty one period in advance. When p is uncertain, the entire probability
distribution of p would generally matter for the leader's optimal choice of P511
However, for present purposes, we assume that equation (12) is a satisfactory
approximation.'2
If p exceeds Ep, then p /p = (Ep/p) falls correspondingly below the
intended markup level, p, in all sectors, and the demand for intermediates rises.
We continue to assume, for now, that the lowest-cost provider of intermediate
goods in each sector always meets the demand even when the real price is lower
than intendedJ3 If we also assume that all sectors have the same markup
ratio—p5 = p for all j—then the expression for aggregate output from equation
(6) is modified by replacing the parameter p by it. (Ep/p) to get
Y = AV(1°)0°/('°)L. [(1/it) .(p/Ep)1aI()N. (13)
Hence, unexpected inflation raises output. Moreover, because of the distortion
from markup pricing of the intermediate goods, this expansion of output is
efficient, at least over some range of unexpected inflation, If > 1, then the
outcome p/Ep = > 1 would generate the efficient level of production. That
is, this amount of unexpected inflation would exactly offset the distortion from
markup pricing.
The result for aggregate consumption is now a modification of equation (7):
C = A11° /(l_a)L {ft1/it). (p/Ep)]l/(l_O). (it Ep —. N}.(14)
For amonopolist the value of p that maximizes expected profit is given in general by j'/('—°) f(p)dp p. =
j00°pa/(la) .f(p)dp
wheref) is the one-period-ahead probability density function for p.Ifa = 1/2, then this
expression simplifies to
Eppj=(1+s ), a
wherea is the coefficient of variation of p. Hence, in this case: equation (12) holds (with
= 1/a) if << 1. If log(p)isnormally distributed with variance 52, then
Ep a 2
P1= —.expk)a ]. a 1—a
Hence equation (12) hoLds here (with j.cj = 1/a) if 02 << 1.
12The subsequent analysis would not change materially if we modified the right-hand side
of equation (12) to include higher moments of the distribution of p.
"If p falls short of Ep,thenthe markup ratio rises above the target level. jz. In this
case, higher cost firms in each sector might find it profitable to produce and sell intermediate
goods. However, these firms would not have been willing, cx ante, to offer a fixed-nominal-
price contract in which they were willing to meet whatever demands were realized. Since we
are considering only these types of contracts, we assume that these competitor firms do not
enter the market! cx post.
11We can show that C rises with p/Ep if p/Ep .cpand is maximized when
p/Ep =p.This result corresponds to the efficient use of intermediates for
production when p/Ep =p.
We can also show that C falls with p/Ep when p/Ep ￿ p. In this range,
intermediates would be overutilized from an efficiency standpoint (if the lowest-
cost providers still meet the demand). Hence, while gross output continues
to rise with unexpected inflation, net output and consumption decline. Thus,
although some amount of unexpected inflation would be attractive—because it
offsets existing distortions—too much unexpected inflation would be undesirable
because it creates new distortions on net.
If p/Ep > p then the real price of intermediates falls short of the lowest-
cost provider's cost of production. As in the case discussed before where p < 1,
the lowest-cost producers of intermediates would then do better, ex post, by
shutting down, Of course, this failure to meet demand violates the form of the
fixed-nominal-price contract that we had assumed, that is, the willingness to
meet whatever demand materialized, ex post, at the set nominal price. In any
case, if the leader in each sector were to shut down, then too much unexpected
inflation would result in a drastic decline of output and consumption. This
result reinforces the conclusion that too much unexpected inflation would have
adverse consequences.
>Froin the standpoint of a policymaker, the model rationalizes a loss func-
tion in which some amount of unexpected inflation (for prices of final product),
irire, reduces the loss. This kind of effect is often assumed in monetary models
of rules versus discretion, such as Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and
Gordon (1983).Inthe present model and in some of the rules-versus-discretion
literature, the negative effect of ic— Ireon the loss diminishes with the size of
—Ire,eventually becomes nil, and subsequently changes sign. The amount of
the initial loss reduction and the size of the interval over which unexpected infla-
tion is beneficial depends on the extent of the existing distortion. In the present
model, the distortion increases with the markup ratio, p. Thus, the policy-
maker would value unexpected inflation more when p was higher, that is, when
the extent of competition was smaller. Therefore, in the rules-versus-discretion
setting, a higher p would result in a higher equilibrium rate of inflation.
The positive effect of unexpected inflation on output in equation (13) reflects
an increase in the use of intermediates and, thereby, a rise in the marginal
product of labor. Therefore, unexpected inflation increases the real wage rate,
which is now given as a modification of equation (8) by
W =(1
—a).Al/(l_a)a/(1_a).[(1/p) .(p/Ep)]"N. (15)
This result means that unexpected inflation causes the real wage rate to move
procyclically. Labor's share of the total gross product, WL/Y, is, however, still
fixed at 1— a.
If the total labor supply, L, is fixed, then employment is constant and,
hence, acyclical. However, as before, a positive response of labor supply to the
increased real wage rate would generate a procyclical pattern for employment, as
12observed in the data. This positive response is particularly likely for unexpected
price-level changes, which have to be temporary. In this case, the income effect
from a higher real wage rate would be minor, and the main influence would be
the substitution effect that favored work over leisure.
If the markup ratios, p, are heterogeneous across the sectors, then equation
(10) applies to aggregate output if 1/pd is replaced by (p/Ep) (i/ps). The
same change applies to the expression for aggregate consumption in equation
(11). ilowever, these formulas are again valid only if the lowest-cost provider
in each sector always meets the demand for intermediates. As p/Ep rises to
reach the various p, the corresponding sectors become unprofitable, and the
providers would have the incentive, ex post, to shut down.
A new element with heterogeneity in the markup ratios is that the sectors
do not all become unprofitable at the same time—in the earlier context, when
p/Ep reached the common markup ratio, p. Suppose, without loss of generality,
that the sectors are ordered so that p1 < p < p, etc. Then sector 1 would
be motivated to close down when p/Ep reached t'i, sector 2 would also be
motivated to close when p/Ep reached P2,andso on. Thus, this adverse effect
of excessive inflation now sets in only gradually.
3 The Model with Two Open Economies
3.1 The Real Model
To consider two or more open economies, we use a variant of the framework
developed in Krugman (1980), llelpman and Krugman (1985, Chs. 10, 11),
Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg (2000), and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2000). Suppose that there are two countries, where country I produces the
intermediates j= 1,...,N'and country lithe intermediates j= N'+l,...,N'+
N". (Generalization to more than two countries is straightforward.) We assume
that the countries do not overlap in the types of intermediate goods that they
produce, so that there still exists a single lowest-cost provider for each variety
of intermediate, Hence, domestic and foreign producers do not compete directly
in the provision of a particular type of intermediate input.
Within each country, there is assumed to be free trade and no transaction
costs for shipping goods. The shipping of an intermediate good across country
borders entails transaction costs, which can reflect transport expenses and trade
barriers. Specifically, we assume an iceberg technoloy, whereby, for each unit
of intermediate good shipped from country I to country II or the reverse, 1— b
units arrive, with 0 < b < 1. Note that the trading cost, b, is assumed to reflect
the using up of real resources, not a transfer from one party to another (as
would be true for a tariff). We assume that transaction costs for shipping final
product (and, therefore, consumer goods) abroad are nil.





Hence,for a producer in country I, there are now N' domestic and N" foreign
types of intermediate goods available. Each type of intermediate in country
I (and, analogously, in country II) is assumed to feature a single real price,
P1, which applies at the point of origin for domestic and foreign purchasers.
Since foreigners receive only 1 —bunits for each unit bought, their effective
price per unit of j-type intermediate good employed in production is Pj/(1 —b).
Thus, domestic purchasers of intermediates face markup pricing, whereas foreign
purchasers face markup pricing and shipping costs. This price differential will
impart a home bias in the demand for intermediate inputs.
The first-order conditions for the choices of intermediate inputs by the pro-
ducers of final product in country I are now
=P,j =1,...,N', (17)
=1—b'j=N'+1, ...,N' + N".
The new element here is that the price relevant for foreign goods is P/(1 —b).
The determination of the markup ratios for each of the intermediate goods
produced in country I again follows the limit-pricing results:
.Pj =ifl<it<l/, (18)
Pj =1/aif p￿1/a,forj=1,..,,N'.
As before, we interpret jtasreflecting the degree of competition, in the sense of
the gap between the production costs of the most efficient and next most efficient
providers of intermediates in each sector. If the structure of competition is the
same across sectors of country I, then the same markup ratio, ji= jt, applies
in each sector of country I .Extensionto the case of heterogeneity across the
sectors is straightforward and follows the analysis for the one-country case.
Pricing solutions of the form of equation (18) also apply to the intermediate
goods produced in country II. If the structure of competition is the same across
these sectors, then the single markup ratio, jt",appliesto all of the sectors in
country II.
Substitution of P =i' forj=1,...,N' andP =jt"forj =N'+
1, ...,N'+ N" into equation (17) determines the quantities of intermediates
employed by firm i in country I:
Xjj =(Aa/itI)h/(1)L, j= 1N', (19)
Xj =[(Aa/ji')(1— b)]1/1 L, j= N'+ 1N' + N".
14Substitution of the results from equation (19) into equation (16) and aggregation
over the firms determines the level of aggregate output in country I:
=A11a1"L'• {(ly/(1_a)N'+ (b)a/(l_n) N"} (20)
whereL' is the aggregate labor in country I. The new element, relative to
the closed-economy result in equation (6), is the term involving the N" foreign
types of intermediate goods. These inputs count with the weight (4)n/(1—n).<
1, which is less than that for the N' domestic types because of the shipping cost
term, 1 —b.From the perspective of incentives to use the intermediate inputs,
markup pricing (p" > 1) and trading costs (b> 0) have similar and reinforcing
effects.
The real wage rate in country I again equals the marginal product of labor
and can be calculated from equations (16) and (20) as14
TV' =(1
—a)
.AhI(1 )au/(1 {(r/(1_a) N'+(b)a/(l_n)
-
(21)
Labor's share of the country's total gross product, W'L'/Y', is still the con-
stant 1— a.
The second part of equation (19) determines the quantity of intermediate
goods produced in country II and used by final-goods producers in country
I. The value of these imported goods, gross of shipping costs, is determined
by multiplying the quantity of intermediates by i"/(1 —b).The resulting
expression for imports, which is gross of the iceberg losses on the intermediate
goods shipped from country II to country I, is
Value of imports of intermediates to country I (22)
=(Aa)1/(1)
.
Anexpression analogous to the second part of equation (19) determines the
quantity of country I's intermediates used by final-goods producers in country
II. The corresponding value of the exports of intermediate goods from country
I to country II can be calculated, after multiplication by it'/(i —b),as
Value of exports of intermediates from country 1 (23)
=(Aa)1/(1_).(L_P)a/(1_a)NILIJ
This expression is gross of the iceberg losses on the intermediate goods shipped
from country I to country 11.
1411 b > 0, the real wage rate in country Ii, I4', generally differs from W' if N1 $ N'1
and jj p". We assume here that labor call move freely within a country but cannot move
hem one country to another. Therefore, a single real wage rate applies within a country, but
different rates can apply across countries.
15Balanced trade in intermediate goods results if
N'N" =
p,"L" (24)
Alternatively, if the left-hand side of equation (24) exceeds (or falls short of)
the right-hand side, then country 1 has a net surplus (or deficit) in the trade
in intermediate goods with couiiitry 11. If there are no internationally traded
financial assets, as we assume, then the net trades of goods and services across
country borders must be balanced. Therefore, any net surplus or deficit in the
trade of intermediate goods is balanced by an equal-size net deficit or surplus
in the trade of final products.
The formulas for imports and exports of intermediate goods resemble gravity-
type equations, in the sense of depending on country sizes. However, imports
to country I depend on the product whereasexports from country I
depend on the product N'L". Thus, from the standpoint of exports of inter-
mediates, the relevant size variable is the number of varieties, N' or N", that
a country knows how to produce. In a more general context, this concept of
size would depend on a country's level of technological advancement and might
be proxiied by per capita GDP. From the standpoint of imports of intermedi-
ates, the relevant size variable is the quantity of labor,or This concept
relates to a country's level of GDP.
The results in equations (22) and (23) also resemble familiar gravity models
in the sense of predicting that higher trading costs, b, reduce the overall volume
of trade. Empirically, the parameter b might relate to distance, other measures
of transport costs, the nature of monetary systems, and the extent of similarities
in language, legal systems, culture, colonial heritage, and other variables.
In the present model, the degree of monopoly power reduces the volume
of trade in a manner similar to that for trading costs. Specifically, a higher
markup ratio at home, p, reduces exports of intermediate goods, and a higher
ratio abroad, reduces imports of intermediate goods. An increase in markup
ratios in both countries lowers the overall volume of trade.
Aggregate consumption in country I now equals the country's output of
final goods less its production of intermediates plus the country's net surplus hi
intermediate trade with country 11.15 The resulting formula is
C' = . (25)




Itfollows immediately that C' is diminishing in country Ii's markup ratio,
j.t".However,this result assumes that producers of intermediate goods in
This equality holds because there is, by assumption, no net borrowing or lending between
thc two countries. Otherwise. some disturbances—such as a temporary shock to the markup
ratio in one country—might motivate net borrowing or lending between the co,,ntries. The
introd,iction of these international capital flows would not change any of the main results.
-16country II always meet the demand. If, instead, these producers would shut
down in the face of losses, then 12" =1would be the preferred markup ratio
from the standpoint of country I.
For given p", the effect ofonC' involves two considerations. First, with
respect to home purchases of domestically produced intermediates, we again
find that the consumption maximizing markup ratio is t" =1,so that the use
of these intermediates would not be distorted. However, for foreign buyers, the
maximization of C' dictates a markup ratio of /2' =1/a,the monopoly value.
This result corresponds to the usual monopoly tariff, which applies because
the residents of country I do not internalize the benefits of competition for
residents of country II. If it were possible for domestic sellers of intermediates
to discriminate between domestic and foreign buyers,16 then the consumption
maximizing choices would be a markup ratio of one for domestic buyers and a
markup ratio of 1/a for foreign buyers. If a single markup ratio applies to all
buyers—as we have been assuming—then the consumption maximizing choice of
1/ji' turns out to be a weighted average of 1 and a. The proportionate weights
on these values are given, respectively, by L' and (1 — II".Hence,
a larger trading cost, b, and a lower ratio ofto L' make the monopoly
tariff effect less important. The actual markup ratio that the producers of
intermediates determine—from equation (18)—may be higher or lower than the
consumption maximizing value, depending on the extent of competition that
prevails in country I.
3.2 Non-final price stickiness
We now introduce nominal price stickiness and, hence, possible roles for each
country's monetary policy into the open-economy setting. For country I, let
p again be the nominal price of the jth intermediate good and p the nominal
price of final goods (and, hence, consumer goods), all of which sell at one price.
Country II uses a different currency and denomiuates its prices, p and p, in
units of that currency. If all nominal prices were flexible, then the preceding
analysis would go through, with the relative prices of each intermediate good,
pj/p and p/p*, set at the markup level, This markup ratio is given for
country I by equation (18) and for country II by an analogous expression. We
again assume that the degree of competition is the same across sectors within
each country.
Suppose that p and p are determined through some independent stochastic
processes by each country's monetary authority. We assume that the nominal
exchange rate, c, is flexible and adjusts so that the standard PPP condition
'tAn individual producer has an incentive to discriminate oniy if the elasticities of demand
differacrossthe groups. However, a policymaker who cares ahont the welfare of the rep-
reseritative domestic individual has the incentive to discriminate even if the elasticities of




Thiscondition is consistent with the assumption that final product is homoge-
neous and internationally tradeable with zero transaction costs.
Assume again that in country I, the nominal price p for j= 1,...,N'is set
one period in advance by the lowest-cost producer of each type of intermediate
good. (We shall make a parallel assumption about price setting in country II.)
The nominal price of each of country I's intermediate goods in the nominal cur-
rency unit of country ii is given from equation (26) by pj/c =p.(p*/p). Hence,
the relative price faced by a buyer in country II is given, after division by p,
pj/p, just as in country 1. (The relative price is the same in the two countries
because of the PPP condition in equation [26].) The quantity demanded of this
intermediate good by producers of final product in both countries will again be
a constant-elasticity function of this common relative price.
The nominal prices of intermediate goods will now be given in country I by
Ep, (27)
forj =1N', and in country II by
ptii". Ejt, (28)
for j= N'+ 1, ...,N'+ N". If p exceeds Ep, then the relative price Pj/P
falls correspondingly below the intended markup level, p'. Therefore, the de-
mand for country I intermediates by final goods producers rises in both coun-
tries. Analogously, an excess of p above Ep* raises the demand for country
II intermediates in both countries. We assume, for now, that the producers of
intermediate goods in each country meet the demands that are forthcoming at
these reduced real prices.
>From the standpoint of output in country I, the parameterinequation
(20) is replaced by ii'.Ep/pfor the N' sectors of country I. Analogously, the
parameter it"isreplaced by /2". Ep*/p*for the N" sectors of country II.
Therefore, country I's output is now given by
=Al/(l_a)/()L. (29)
{
K1/') - (p/Ep)]Q/(l_&)N' + [(1b) (p*/Ep*)]a/(l_a) .N"}.
Hence, unexpected inflation in either country raises output in country I. (The
results are analogous for country II.) The effect from foreign inflation is atten-
uated by the trading cost term, 1 —b.The relative strengths of domestic and
foreign unexpected inflation on domestic output depend also on the size of the
home country, measured by relativeto the size of the foreign country, N".
Because of the distortion from the markup pricing of the intermediate goods,
18unexpected inflation tends to offset the distortion and leads thereby to an effi-
cient expansion of output. The outcomes p/Ep =1u'> 1 and p*/Ep* =>1
would generate the efficient levels of production in both countries.
The real wage rate in country I is now
WI =(1
—a).Ah/(l_f/(l_a). (30)
{[(ifr').(p/Ep)]a/(l_a)N' + [(1—b) (p*/Ep*)]a/(l_n) -
Therefore,unexpected inflation in either country raises the real wage rate in
country I. The mechanism is that unexpected inflation spurs increased use
of intermediates in country I—domestic in the case of domestic inflation and
foreign in the case of foreign inflation—and thereby raises the marginal product
of labor. Thus, the real wage rate moves procyclically in response to nominal
stimuli. Labor's share of the total gross product, WL/YI, is, however, still
fixed at 1— a,
We can evaluate how different outcomes for unexpected inflation, say p/Ep
for country I, affect consumption, C'.'7 The optimal choice of p/Ep (ex post)
is analogous to the consumption maximizing choice of country I's markup ratio,
as considered in the previous section. If p' =1/a(the monopoly value),
then C' is increasing in p/Ep when p/Ep =1,but th[s effect diminishes toward
zero as p/Ep approaches a value that lies between 1 and 1/a.18 Consumption,
C', decreases with p/Ep at still higher values of p/Ep. If 1 <it' < 1/a, then
the range in which unexpected inflation is valued is narrower, and if It' < 1/a,
the optimal choice of p/Ep may be less than one. Therefore, as in the closed-
economy model, the policymaker would value unexpected inflation only over
some range. Moreover, because some of the benefit from unexpected inflation
now goes to foreigners, the range for which the marginal valuation is positive is
narrower in the two-country model than in the one-country setting. Ill particu-
lar, if It' =1/a,it is no longer optimal for p/Ep to be as high as 1/a.
This model has some surprising implications about how trade and monetary
unions would affect a policymaker's incentive to inflate, ex post.19 If country
i is a closed economy, the monetary authority would value surprise inflation
as long as p/Ep < it'. Since i' > 1, the preferred inflation surprise is always
positive. Moreover, the higher the distortion, z', the greater is the incentive
to inflate. Therefore, in a discretionary equilibrium of the type considered by
Barro and Gordon (1983), the inflation rate would tend to be higher the higher
is p'.
17w again omit any international capital markets, so that each country's consumption
equals its net income.
15By analogy to the results in the previous section, the consumption maximizing value of
a weighted average of 1 and a, where the proportionate weights are given by L' and
(1 —by/U_a).L'1,respectively.
lOwe are grateful to Jaume Ventura for thcse ideas (which we have hopefully not
misinterpreted).
19If country I opens up to trade, say by entering into a trading union with
country II, the incentive to inflate diminishes because part of the benefit from
inflation surprises goes to residents of country II. (The assumption is that
these foreign benefits are not internalized in some way by the policymaker of
country I.) This effect is more important the lower is the trading cost, b, and
the higher is the relative size of country II (in the sense of N" relative to N').
Therefore, in a discretionary equilibrium, the inflation rate would tend to be
lower than under autonomy. Moreover, the more open the economy the lower
the equilibrium inflation rate.
Now suppose that the two countries go further by adopting a monetary
union. The key assumption here is that the common monetary authority takes
into account the beneficial effects of surprise inflation in both countries. In this
case, the benefits from inflation surprises are similar to those that arose under
autonomy. Hence, the equilibrium inflation rate tends to be higher than that
without the monetary union. Of course, monetary union can have other effects
that favor low inflation, for example, if a client country effectively obtains the
policy commitment possessed by the anchor country (see Barro and Alesina
[2000]).Thepoint here is that the present model identifies one reason why
monetary union would be inflationary.
4 A Little Empirical Evidence
In the various versions of the model, the critical variables are markup ratios,
measured as prices of specialized, imperfectly competitive products expressed
relative to undifferentiated, competitive products. These relative output prices
move countercydically, either because of shifts in the extent of competition or
because of nominal disturbances that mimic the effects of changes in competi-
tion. In the model, the specialized products were intermediate goods, and the
undifferentiated ones were final goods and labor inputs. However, these identi-
fications are not crucial for the general approach. The basic hypothesis is that
the relative prices of less competitive goods move countercyclic.ally. Therefore,
an important test of the theory is that appropriately measured relative prices
move in the hypothesized manner during business cycles.20
We begin tth some existing empirical evidence that bears on the model's
predictions about relative prices. Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, Table 8) find
that markups are more negatively correlated with GNP in sectors with higher
four-firm concentration ratios. Thus, if the concentration ratio is a satisfactory
measure of imperfect competition, then the conclusion is that markups are more
countercyclical in less competitive industries. However, this analysis depends
on inferring markup ratios from an estimated model of the production function,
and we are unsure how to interpret these constructed measures. We have similar
misgivings about constructed estimates of markup ratios in the analyses of Bils
20A natural comparison is with theories in which the nominal wage rate is sticky relative to
tile nominal price of final product. These theories have been largely abandoned because they
imply counterfactuatly, a conotercyclical pattern for the real wage rate.
20(1987) and Hall (1988). Therefore, we find it preferable to rely on empirical
evidence that uses movements in observed relative prices.
Basu (1995, Table 5) found in U.S.datathat the ratios of prices of mate-
rials inputs—defined to include all intermediate goods and services—to wages
tended to move couutercyclically.21 This evidence supports our basic model, in
which the specialized, imperfectly competitive products were identified with the
intermediate inputs. However, Basu's evidence can be viewed as a restatement
of the familiar observation that real wages are procyclical. From the perspective
of the theory, it would be more interesting to examine the behavior of prices of
intermediate goods expressed relative to prices of final product. Moreover, the
Basu analysis relies on the identification of the less competitive goods with the
intermediate inputs.
Kraay and Ventura (2000,Table3) used data for a sample of GECE) countries
to examine the cyclical behavior of prices of goods of varying capital intensity.
They found that the relative prices of capital-intensive products were counter-
cyclical. This evidence supports the present model if, as seems plausible, more
capital-intensive products tend to be more specialized and, hence, less compet-
itive. However, the extent of the association between capital intensity and the
degree of competition is unclear.
To find evidence that bears more directly on our theory, we examined the
behavior of price defiators for industry shipments in U.S. manufacturing at
the four-digit level. The data, assembled by the National Bureau of Economic
Research, are annual from 1958 to 1997 and cover over 400 industries.22 We
constructed the price ratio pjt/ptforeach sector jandyear t, where Pjt is the
price deflator for shipments from industry jandPt 15 the overall GDP deflator.
We computed an estimate of the cyclical component of the logarithm of Pjt/Pt
by means of a Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter applied to the time series for each
industry.23 We then related each time series to an indicator of the business
cycle—the H-P filtered value of the logarithm of real per capita GDP in the
overall economy.
The first finding is that relative prices of manufacturing products are coun-
tercyclical overall. An OLS regression with 14,200 observations of H-P filtered
log(pt/p1) on H-P filtered log of real per capita GDP yields an estimated co-
efficient of -0.22 (s.e.=0.05). This finding—that manufacturing relative prices
are countercydicai—would support the underlying model if manufacturing were
21 >From the perspective of the present theory, materials input is a heterogeneous category
that includes raw materials, which are likely to be highly competitive, and manufactured
goods, which may resemble the specialized intermediate inputs that enter into the model.
However, the empirical results for the aggregate of materials input may nevertheless be relevant
for the model because, as Basu (1995) observes, "raw materials and energy are actually only
a small fraction of total intermediate inputs. In a modern economy, by far the largest share
of these inputs is devoted to purchases of goods manufactured by other firms."
22The data originate from the Annual Surveys of Manufactures and the Censuses of Manu-
factures of the U.S. Bureau of the Ccnsus. See Bartelsman and Gray (1996) for a discussion.
Updates of the data are compiled by Eric Bartlesman. Randy Becker, and Wayne Gray and
are available from the website of the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER.org).
23We used a standard smoothing paramoter for annual data of 100 to compute all of the
filtered values.
21generally less competitive than the rest of the economy. However, for our pur-
poses, the more interesting issue is how the cyclical pattern within the manu-
facturing sector relates to an industry's degree of competition.
We measured an industry's extent of competition by using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of firm concentration for 1982.24 The assumption, as in Rotem-
berg and Woodford (1991), is that greater industrial concentration signals less
competition. We then ran OLS regressions in which the data were stratified into
deciles in accordance with the Herfindahi indexes. The results are in Table 1.
The point estimates of the coefficients on the log of H-P filtered real per capita
GDP are all negative. More interestingly, as one moves from low to high con-
centration sectors, the magnitude of the coefficient tends to rise—from values
that range from -0.04 to -0.14 in the first five groups to values from -0.16 to
-0.47 in the second five groups.25 However, a formal test of the hypothesis that
all coefficients are equal yields an F-statistic of only 1.0. Hence, the hypothesis
that all ten coefficients are the same is accepted at usual critical levels.
Thble 1
Cyclical Coefficients as a Function of Industrial Concentration
Decile for Range ofEstimated Coefficient Number of
Herfindahi Index log(Herflndahl) (s.e.) Observations
1 1.6-4.6 -0.14 (0.10) 1400
2 4.6-5.1 -0.04 (0.12) 1440
3 5.1-5.4 -0.09 (0.13) 1400
4 5.4-5.8 -0.14 (0.13) 1400
5 5.8-6.1 -0.13 (0.15) 1440
6 6.1-6.4 -0.47 (0.19) 1400
7 6.4-6.7 -0.40 (0.16) 1440
8 6.7-7.0 -0.16 (0.17) 1480
9 7.0-7.3 -0.42 (0.13) 1400
10 7.3-8.0 -0.23 (0.18) 1440
Note: The estimated coefficients come from OLS regressions of the H-P ifitered
value of log(p1/pt) on the H-P filtered value of the log of real per capita GDP,
where Pjt is the deflator for shipments by industry jandPt 15 the GDP deflator.
Each regression is run for observations corresponding to the indicated range for
the Herflndahl indexes. See the text for sources of data.
The results are clearer if we break the data into just two groups, one corre-
sponding to Herfindahl indexes in the lower half of its range and the other to
24These data are available for 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997. The 1982 figures are in U.S.
Bureau of the Coosus, U.S. Ecotsoroic Gensos. 1982. Our results do not change greatly if we
base the groupings for the Herfindalil indexes on data for the other available years.
251f we allow for industry intercepts, the estimated coefficients are essentially zero. This
result is oot surprising because the dependent and independent variables—which are H-P
filtered values—have zero mean by construction. Results are also virtually the same in a
random-effects specification.
22indexes in the upper half. In this case, the estimated coefficients on the log of
H-P filtered real per capita GDP are -0107 (0.058)inthe lower half and -0.330
(0.075) in the upper half. A test of the hypothesis that the coefficients are equal
yields a t-statistic of 2.4. Therefore, the hypothesis of equality is rejected at less
than the 0,01 critical level in favor of the alternative that the magnitude of the
coefficient is greater for the more concentrated sectors. This finding supports
the hypothesis that movements of relative ontput prices are more countercydical
in less competitive sectors of the economy.
One possible problem with the procedure is that a measure of industrial con-
centration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, need not be an accurate
gauge of the extent of competition. Another potential problem is that sectors
that exhibit greater concentration may have characteristics aside from less com-
petition that cause their relative prices to be more countercyclical. It may be
possible to hold constant some of these other characteristics in an extended
analysis.
5 Summary of Major Results
In the basic model, intermediate inputs are specialized and, hence, imperfectly
competitive, whereas final product is undifferentiated and, therefore, competi-
tive. An increase in the extent of competition encourages use of the interme-
diate goods and leads, thereby, to an expansion of output, labor productivity,
and consumption. The increase in the marginal product of labor implies a rise
in the real wage rate. The likely positive effect of the real wage rate on labor
supply generates an expansion of employment. Similar effects from increases
in competition would result if some or all of the specialized goods were final
products.
The basic model treats the intermediate goods as nondurables. However, a
more realistic identification of the intermediate inputs is with investment goods,
such as machine tools and computers. Hence, in a mOre general setting, the
increased investment in these goods would be the key channel that connects the
underlying disturbances to the responses of output.
The link with nominal variables and monetary policy arises because the spe-
cialized intermediate inputs are assumed to feature relatively sticky nominal
prices. Under these conditions, nominal expansion—in the form of an unex-
pected increase in the price of final product—tends to reduce the relative price
of the intermediate goods. Hence, nominal expansion tends to mimic the real
effects of an increase in the extent of competition. Specifically, the model pre-
dicts increases in output, consumption, labor productivity, the real wage rate,
and employment. These effects would arise in a more general model as long as
the less competitive goods tended to have more rigid nominal prices.
The extension to the open economy is straightforward if trade in the special-
ized intermediate inputs involves transaction costs, whereas trade in undifferen-
tiated final product does not entail these costs, The latter assumption implies a
standard PPP condition for final goods. In this environment, increases in the
23extent of foreign competition reduce the real cost of foreign-produced interme-
diate inputs and are therefore expansionary at home. Similarly, if the foreign
nominal prices of intermediate goods are sticky relative to the price of final prod-
uct, then unexpected inflation abroad tends to lower the real cost of the foreign
intermediate goods. Unexpected foreign inflation is therefore expansionary for
the home country.
In the various versions of the model, the central hypothesis is that the rel-
ative prices of less competitive goods move countercycically. We found that
this hypothesis was supported by some new empirical evidence on the cyclical
behavior of prices from four-digit manufacturing industries.
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